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I. INTRODUCTION 
Agreements are at the heart of contract law. In Anglo-
American Common Law a persistent problem has been 
determining which agreements should be enforced. The 
common law has no difficulty dealing with bargained-
for agreements between merchants exchanging goods 
for money, but has far more difficulty with agreements 
where there is no clear quid pro quo, and therefore 
"consideration" is doubtful. Most typically these 
agreements include guaranties, gifts and other gratui-
tous promises. Why shouldn't my agreement to meet 
Professor Sellers this evening for dinner be enforce-
able? 
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Over twenty years ago Professor Randy E. Barnett 
first proposed what he calls a "consent theory" of con-
tract that he believes resolves most of these issues in 
American common law. For the last two decades he has 
promoted his theory and has gained significant attention 
from the legal academy. This discussion will consider: 
why the United States has contracts law theories; the 
basic elements of Professor Barnett's theory; how these 
elements are similar to Continental law;American legal 
insularity in evaluating Barnett's theory without refer-
ence to Continental systems; and finally, why this au-
thor believes that American example of law harmoniza-
tion through restate-ment and voluntary adoption of 
uniform laws is not a good model for a future European 
civil code. 
II. WHY THE UNITED STATES HAS CONTRACT 
LA W "THEORIES" 
The last 30 years have seen a remarkable blossoming 
of contracts law scholarship in the United States and the 
development of a variety of contracts law theories such 
as that of Professor Barnett. Europeans have looked 
with a certain envy at the "rich literature" of American 
contracts law and contrast that literature to what they 
see as the "anti-theoretical nature of Continental Civil 
Law contracts scholarship. 
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Law and economics scholarship-which is by no 
means limited to contracts law-in particular has pro-
voked considerable interest in Europe. American con-
tracts law scholars are proud to point to the "richness" 
of American contract law and hope, in writing about it, 
that they will gain the notice of scholars in other legal 
systems. I 
Europeans ought not to be envious of American con-
tracts theories: they are indicative of the failure of the 
American legal system to develop a comprehensive set 
of contracts rules. A Greek professor, Aristides N. Hat-
zis, while admiring American contract theory, correctly 
points out why there are no comparable theories in Con-
tinental law: "in Civil Law there is no need for theories 
since the legislator, mainly through codes, has pro-
claimed what the law should be and the judge is (sup-
posedly) a mere interpreter, useful only for accommo-
dating trivial twists of facts." Hatzis observes that the 
lack of codes in Common Law creates a need for theo-
ries "in order to provide a sense of security to the con-
tracting parties who did not place any trust in the ca-
prices of individual judges and were looking for a more 
objective basis for their economic relationships.,,2 
We have theory in the United States because our at-
tempts at codes and rules have failed. For most of the 
nineteenth century the legal community in the United 
States debated the merits and demerits of codifica-
I See, in particular, Robert A. Hillman, THE RICHNESS OF CONTRACT LAW: AN 
ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE OF CONTEMPORARY THEORIES OF CONTRACT LAW 
(1997). For a critical review, see Randy E. Barnett, Book Review, 97 MICH. L. 
REV. 1413 (1999). 
2 HATZIS at 5. 
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tion. We had our own debate similar to that in Ger-
many between Savigny and Thibaut. In Germany the 
code won when the nation unified, but in the United 
States, the fight took place at the state level and the 
code lost. The debate began in the early part of the 
nineteenth century and lasted until the death in 1894 
of the most prominent of codification proponents, 
David Dudley Field. Field, America's Thibaut, one 
might say, saw rules as essential for predictability in 
law. 3 His great opponent, James Coolidge Carter, 
America's Savigny, argued that statutory rules "are 
rigid and absolute, and cannot be modified and 
shaped to suit the varying aspects which different 
cases may exhibit.,,4 Politics as much as jurispruden-
tial reasoning accounts for the defeat of the codes. 
They simply were inconvenient for the practicing bar. 
When the codification movement failed at the end 
of the nineteenth century, alternative steps were taken 
to unify the law of the several states. The drive for 
unification of state law led to creation of two institu-
tions which survive to this day: the National Confer-
ence of Commissioners on Uniform State Law (Con-
ference), founded in 1892, and the American Law 
Institute (ALI), founded in 1923. 
3 Stephan N. Subrin, David Dudley Field and the Field Code: A Historical 
Analysis of an Earlier Procedural Vision, 6 LAW & HIST. REV. 311, 340 
(1988) ("In Field's world, predictability is more likely to be achieved with 
relatively inflexible rules and precise definition and by curbing judicial discre-
tion. Field did understand that some unpredictability was unavoidable; a statute 
could not cover all situations and judges, on occasion, would have to analogize 
or make new law.") 
4 James Coolidge Carter, THE PROPOSED CODIFICATION OF OUR COMMON 
LAW (1884), excerpted in THE LIFE OF THE LAW, READINGS ON THE GROWTH 
OF LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 115, 120 (John Honold ed., 1964). 
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Some Europeans have a rather rosy view of the suc-
cess of these institutions.5 Both the National Confer-
ence and the ALI depend upon voluntary adoption of 
their work. The Conference and the ALI have almost no 
coercive power. Their mandates focus on rationalizing 
existing law in the form of uniform laws and restate-
ments; law innovation, once almost clearly foreclosed, 
still does not fit easily in their programs.6 Few would 
question that the Conference and the ALI have had 
salutary effects on the content and uniformity of Ameri-
can law, but those. effects have not been nearly as sub-
stantial as their founders had hoped. In the first century 
of its existence, the Conference proposed approximately 
200 uniform acts. Only about 10 percent of these Acts 
have been adopted by as many as forty states; more than 
half were adopted by fewer than ten states. Since ALI 
Restatements are not proposed for legislative adoption, 
their adoption necessarily is piecemeal. Lacking rules, 
we have theory. This brings us to Professor Barnett's 
theory. 
III. BARNETT'S CONSENT THEORY OF 
CONTRACT 
A central issue of the law of obligations is when 
agreements should be enforced. In answering this ques-
5 See James R. Maxeiner, Standard Terms Contracting in the Global Electronic 
Age: European Alternatives, 29 YALE J. INT'L L. 109, 141, n. 196 (2003) 
6 See James J. White, One Hundred Years of Uniform State Laws: Ex Proprio 
Vigore, 89 MICH. L. REV. 2096, 2098-99 (1991). 
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tion in the Anglo-American common law of contracts 
the doctrine of consideration plays the central role. 
Consideration is a "strange notion" for jurists in the 
Continental tradition. The doctrine's roots are lost in 
history. Even today it remains "obscure" and "relatively 
ill-defined and controversial.,,7 In present-day America, 
understanding consideration is a benefit received or a 
detriment suffered. It must be bargained for. 8 
Although consideration is a mandatory feature of in-
struction in contracts classes and on the bar examina-
tion, there is no consensus in the Common Law world 
that consideration is a concept worth keeping.9 Indica-
tive of this ambivalence is the treatment consideration 
received in the drafting of the Principles of European 
Contract Law. While drafters were generally disposed 
toward their own systems as "natural and just," consid-
eration is one example that the Commission Chairman, 
Professor Ole Lando, gives when drafters found weak-
ness in their own systems. He reports that "[t]here was 
no enthusiasm in the common law camp for the doc-
trine," so it was omitted. \0 
Professor Barnett himself long ago reminded his 
American colleagues that the bargain theory of consid-
eration is "unavoidably plagued by serious defects." II It 
7 Denis Tallon, Introduction, in HUGH BEAL ET AL., CASES, MATERIALS AND 
TEXT ON CONTRACT LAW 140 (2002) [hereinafter cited as TALLON]. 
8 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 17,71. 
9 TALLON. 
10 Ole Lando, Comparative Law and Lawmaking, 75 TUL. L. REv. 1015, 1022 
(2001). 
II Randy E. Barnett, Contract Scholarship and the Reemergence of Legal 
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has two principal problems: some agreements are en-
forced, even though there is no bargain, while other 
agreements are not enforced, even though there is a 
bargain. In most commercial cases there is no problem 
finding the bargained consideration. But the doctrine of 
consideration handles other situations less well where 
there is no bargain or the bargain is elusive, as in the 
case of gifts, actions taken in reliance upon promises, 
and binding offers. 
Barnett finds the American solution to the question of 
contract enforceability inadequate. Essentially, it con-
sists of using bargained-for consid-eration as the princi-
pal device for determining enforceability and of filling 
out gaps with various ad hoc doctrines such as promis-
sory estoppel. 12 The doctrine of promissory estoppel 
provides that "[a] promise which the promisor should 
reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on 
the part of the promisee ... and which does induce such 
action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be 
avoided only by enforcement of the promise." 13 
Barnett would take a different approach. According to 
Barnett, agreements (or more broadly, promises) should 
be enforceable when parties "manifest their consent to a 
legally binding transfer" of preexisting alienable 
rights. 14 There must be a "manifested intention to create 
Philosophy [Book Review of E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS] 97 
tlARV. L. REV. 1223, 1239 (1984) [hereinafter Contract Scholarship]' 
Contract Scholarship at 1240. 
13 REST A TEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90. 
14 Contract Scholarship at 1242. 
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legal relations or (to use another common formulation) 
a manifested intention to be legally bound." 15 This is 
"the key to distinguishing enforceable from unenforce-
able promises." 16 "The basis of contractual obligation is 
not promising per se." It is the manifestation of an in-
tention to be legally bound. "The basis of contract is 
consent." 17 
Barnett distinguishes his consent theory not only 
from bargained consideration and reliance theories, but 
also from other approaches such as a will theory, eco-
nomic efficiency, substantive fairness and restitution. 18 
He offers his theory as a way to negotiate among all of 
these different theories and not as an "independent prin-
ciple or core concern of contract." "[I]t seeks to provide 
a general criterion of contractual enforceability that 
strikes a reasonable and workable balance among the 
[other] party-based, substance-based, and process prin-
ciples .... ,,19 His theory provides a framework for order-
ing these concerns to show where each stands in rela-
tion to the others.2o 
Barnett grounds his consent theory in something 
"more fundamental than the concepts of will, reliance, 
15 Randy E. Barnett, Some Problems with Contract as Promise, 77 CORNELL L. 
REv. 1002, 1027 (1992) [emphasis in original] [hereinafter Contract as Prom-
ise ]. 
16 Id. at 1029. 
17 Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory o/Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 269, 
305 (1986) [hereinafter Consent Theory]. 
18 RANDY E. BARNETf, CONTRACTS: CASES AND DOCTRINES 588-90 (3Cd ed. 
2003) [hereinafter CASEBOOK] 
19 CASEBOOK at 589; see Consent Theory at 271-91. 
20 Consent Theory at 294. 
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efficiency, fairness or bargain.,,21 That something more 
is a theory of individual rights. Individuals have prop-
erty rights that entitle them to use and consume re-
sources. For Barnett, "the consent of the rights holder to 
be legally obligated is the moral component that distin-
guishes valid from invalid transfers of alienable rights 
in a system of entitlements. In sum, legal enforcement 
is morally justified because the promisor voluntarily 
performed acts that conveyed her intention to create a 
legally enforceable obligation by transferring alienable 
rights.,,22 
With painstaking precIsion Barnett shows how his 
theory of consent resolves numerous issues and prob-
lems of modern American contract law. 
Unlike the will theory, the consent theory addresses 
the conundrum of objective versus subjective wills. The 
theory of rights requires that those rights be demar-
cated. Only a manifestation of assent that is accessible 
to all can fulfill that function.23 A consent theory is in-
terested in the actual intentions of the parties, but only 
the objective interpretation of a commitment establishes 
the clear boundaries required by an entitlements ap-
proach.24 Still the objective interpretation is only the 
presumptive meaning; it can be rebutted by a special 
meaning that the parties shared.25 
21 Consent Theory at 293. 
22 Consent Theory at 299. 
23 Consent Theory at 302-03. 
24 Consent Theory at 307. 
25 Consent Theory at 307. 
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The consent theory explains why in certain unusual 
circumstances, the Common Law of contracts enforces 
formal commitments where there is no bargained for 
consideration. The voluntary use of a recognized for-
mality manifests the intention to be legally bound. Here, 
Barnett argues, consent provides "the missing theoreti-
cal foundation of formal contracts and explains their 
proper place in a well-crafted law of contract.,,26 
Where there is bargaining, in the consent theory, 
there is little need to provide explicit proof of an intent 
to be legally bound. The bargaining is itself the evi-
dence of consent.27 Indeed, Barnett's theory regards 
consideration as one way of manifesting assent and not 
as a requirement of a prima facie case of contractual 
obligation. 28 
Barnett sees his consent theory as also explaining 
those circumstances under which promissory estoppel 
grants relief. The reasonable reliance that promissory 
estoppel requires, where the reliance is known or should 
be known to the promising party, serves as that f<arty's 
manifestation of an intention to be legally bound. 9 
Barnett uses his consent theory to explain contract 
defenses as situations where the manifestation of assent 
does not have its normal moral and therefore, legal sig-
26 Consent Theory at 311. 
27 Consent Theory at 313. 
28 Consent Theory at 314. 
29 Consent Theory at 314. 
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nificance. One group of defenses-duress, misrepresen-
tation and possibly unconscionability-are all situations 
in which the manifestation was obtained by the other 
party's improper action. A second group-incapacity, 
infancy and intoxication-hold that the promiser did 
not have the ability to give meaningful assent. Finally a 
third group-mistake, impracticability and frustration-
stem from the inability to fully express in any agree-
ment all possibilities that might affect performance. 30 
Armed with his consent theory, Barnett attacks the 
persistent problem of form contracts. The problem is, if 
contract is based on promise, how can someone have 
promised to do something in a writing she or he has not 
read and was not expected to read. On the one hand, if 
the test is objective action, the parties have agreed. If, 
on the other hand, the test is the subjective view of the 
parties, then one party to the form contract has not 
agreed. 31 For Barnett, the solution is clear: "enforce-
ment of private agreements is not about promising, but 
about manifesting consent to be legally bound." Thus 
what matters is not the assent to do an act, but the as-
sent to be legally bound to do so. The agreement is to 
do whatever the other party says. But, according to 
Barnett, "I agree" really means "I agree to be legally 
bound to (unread) terms that are not radically unex-
pected.,,32 In other words, I agree to terms "that I am 
30 Consent Theory at 318. 
31 Randy E. Barnett, Consenting to Form Contracts, 71 FORDHAM L. REv. 627, 
628 (2002) [hereinafter Form Contracts]. 
32 Form Contracts at 637. 
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not likely to have read but that do not exceed some 
bound of reasonableness.,,33 
IV. SIMILARITIES OF BARNETT'S THEORY OF 
CONTRACT TO CONTRACT LAW IN EUROPE 
By now, contracts scholars in the audience from Civil 
Law countries are suppressing yawns. What is new, 
they may be thinking, about Professor Barnett's theory? 
After all, does not Article 2: 101 of the Principles of 
European Contract Law provide explicitly: "A contract 
is concluded if: a) the parties intend to be legally 
bound, and b) they reach a sufficient agreement without 
any further requirement." Of course it does. 
Intent to be bound runs throughout Continental legal 
systems. For example, Article 3.33 of the Dutch Civil 
Code provides: "A juridical act requires an intention to 
produce juridical effects, which intention has mani-
fested itself by a declaration.,,34 Professor Lando, in 
writing about the Principles of European Contract Law, 
observes that "[t]here is consistency among the laws 
that agreement only becomes a binding contract if the 
parties have intended to be legally bound." Thus, re-
turning to the example at the beginning, in every Euro-
pean legal system, while I may be morally bound to 
honor my promise to have dinner with Professor Sell-
33 Fo~m Contracts at 638. 
34 NEW NETHERLANDS CIVIL CODE: PATRIMONIAL LAW (Haanappel, P.P.C. 
and Mackaay, E., eds. and trans\., \990). 
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ers, I am not legally bound to, because there is no intent 
to be legally bound. 35 
Just how far back in European legal history the con-
cept of "intent to be bound" as a means of validating 
contract enforceability goes, I do not know, but clearly 
it goes back at least as far the nineteenth century when 
it found its way into the German Civil Code. 
The German Civil Code-or BGB-places the doc-
trines of declaration of will (Willenserklarung) and of 
juridical act (Rechtsgeschaft) at the heart of the code's 
treatment of obligations. 36 The BGB enforces objec-
tively manifested statements of consent notwithstanding 
undisclosed subjective intent to the contrary.37 Yet it 
provides that the subjective intentions of the parties are 
to be determined in interpreting their declarations. 38 
The BGB imposes no requirement of consideration and 
validates promises made with intention to be bound 
notwithstanding the absence of anything that might be 
deemed consideration.39 It denies enforceability where 
the promise is not meant seriously and there is no inten-
35 Ole Lando, Salient Features of the Principles of Contract Law: A Compari-
son with the UCC, I3 PACE INT'L L. REV. 339, 345 (2001). 
36 See BGB §§ 116-144. In a much quoted passage from the legislative history 
of the first draft of 1882, the drafters said: 
[Oas Rechtsgeschafi bedeutet] eine Privatwillenserkliirung gerichtet auf die 
Hervorbringung eines rechtlichen Erfolges, der nach der Rechtsordnung 
deswegen eintritt ist. Oas Wesen des Rechtsgeschafts wird darin gefunden, daB 
ein auf die Hervorbringung rechtlicher Wirkungen gerichteter Wille bestatigt, 
und daB der Spruch des Rechtsordnung in Anerkennung dieses Willens die 
~ewollte rechtliche Gestaltung in der RechtsweIt verwirklicht. 
7 BGB § 116 (Geheimer Vorbehalt). 
38 BGB § 133 (Auslegung einer Willenserklarung). 
39 See TALLON at 153. 
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tion to be bound.40 For gratuitous promises, German 
law sometimes has form requirements and the BGB 
provIsions governing Willenserkliirung implement 
those. 41 The doctrine of Willenserkliirung or the still 
more general provisions regarding juristic act treat the 
American contract law defenses. The BGB provides 
that a juristic act that is contrary to law or good morals 
is void. 42 It makes voidable declarations of will pro-
duced by misrepresentation or duress. 43 It provides that 
in most instances the declaration of will of someone 
without capacity is void.44 It makes voidable declara-
tions of will made as a consequent ofmistake.45 All this 
the German Civil Code accomplishes in about 40 rela-
tively short sections that take about seven pages in a 
popular edition. In other parts of the Code it addresses 
impracticability of performance46 and unfair terms in 
standard form contracts.47 The treatment of standard 
terms contracts is similar to that proposed by Barnett, 
but far more robust. 48 The philosophical basis of the 
German Civil Code provisions are an overt manifesta-
tion of the view of freedom of contract as it prevailed in 
the late nineteenth century. 
40 BGB § 117 (Scheingeschiift); § 118 (Mangel der Emstlichkeit). 
41 BGB §§ 125-129. 
42 BGB § 134 (Gesetzliches Verbot); § 138 (Sillenwidriges Rechtsgeschiitft; 
Wucher). 
43 BGB § 123 (Anfechtbarkeit wegen Tiiuschung oder Drohung). 
44 BGB § 145 (Nichtigkeit der Willenserkliirung). Other provisions in this 
section, § 104-1 13, govern limited capacity for minors. 
45 BGB § 119 (Anfechtbarkeit wegen ["turns). 
46 BGB § 119. 
47 BGB §§ 305-309. 
48 See generally, James R. Maxeiner, Standard Terms Contracting in the 
Global Electronic Age: European Alternatives, 29 YALE J. INT'L L. 109 
(2003). 
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V. AMERICAN INSULARITY 
That Barnett's theory of consent is similar to ap-
proaches of European civil law is not remarkable. For 
centuries Common Law countries have borrowed legal 
ideas from Civil Law countries to enrich contract law49 
and Civil Law Countries have borrowed from Common 
Law countries as well. 50 What is remarkable is that 
Barnett-and apparently American contracts law schol-
ars generally-consider Barnett's theory to be a new 
one and have not noted its close similarity to European 
law. 
Barnett likens his theory to new scientific theories 
such as those discussed by Thomas S. Kuhn in that au-
thor's famous 1962 book The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions. Barnett offers his theory as a "potentially 
valuable approach to explaining contractual obligation" 
that might permit "the ongoing discussion of contrac-
tual obligation to emerge from its longstanding intellec-
tual cul-de-sac and begin traveling a more productive 
course.,,51 Barnett counts his theory a controversial one 
and questions whether it is even suitable reading for 
first year students. 52 
Controversial it is. A number of writers have taken is-
sue with it. Its central proposition is largely rejected by 
49 See, e.g., James Gordley, The Common Law in the Twentieth Century: Some 
Unfinished Business, 88 CAL. L. REv. 1815, 1847 (2000). 
50 Perhaps less in contract law directly and more in ancillary areas such as 
~roduct liability and antitrust. 
I Consent Theory at 321. 
52 CASEBOOK at 538. 
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the Restatement (Second) of Contracts in its section 21, 
which provides: "Neither real nor apparent intention 
that a promise be legally binding is essential to the for-
mation of a contract, but a manifestation of intention 
that a promise shall not affect legal relations may pre-
vent the formation of a contract." 
Yet where is the discovery in Barnett's theory? It as-
tonishes that in the twenty years that Barnett's proposal 
has been on the table, apparently no American contracts 
scholar has remarked on the similarities of his theory to 
the Civil Law. 53 Why do I have the feeling that it is as 
if someone in the United States announced the discov-
ery of Pasteurization a century after Pasteur introduced 
it in France? In American patent law, inventors cannot 
claim a patent if anywhere in the world someone has 
published the same idea more than a year before the 
inventor applies for the patent. 
Barnett has told me that he was not aware of Conti-
nental European law when he proposed his theory. 
That's too bad. If he had been, he could have made his 
life a lot easier by studying that law first, and he might 
have made his proposals even better. 
That he was not aware of Continental law is in at least 
one way comforting. He did not conceal, as Karl Lle-
wellyn once recommended, a foreign origin because of 
fear of adverse American reaction. 54 Llewellyn, who 
53 Barnett himself, however, has pointed out similarities to English law. 
54 In his Consent Theory Barnett thanks Professor George Fletcher for helpful 
comments. Fletcher later specifically called the attention of American jurists to 
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was principal drafter of the Uniform Commercial Code, 
took many of his ideas from German law. Yet he did 
not disclose, let alone discuss, their origin. He coun-
seled that to disclose the foreign origin of a legal idea in 
the United States was tantamount to giving it the "kiss 
of death.,,55 
But surely someone, somewhere along the line, has 
thought the similarity worth mentioning? Barnett's 
work has been subject to critical consideration. He and 
other American scholars have discussed his theory at 
length for over two decades. In all of this literature I 
have not found so much as a passing reference to Con-
tinental theories. I conclude that American scholars 
simply were unaware of the foreign law. 
I know from my own experience that this ignorance 
of foreign solutions is not limited to Barnett's theory. 
Contracts scholarship has blossomed in the last thirty 
years and yet other developments central to contract 
law, such as the European Union's Unfair Terms Direc-
tive and Germany's Standard Terms Law, have gone 
completely unnoticed in the United States. And that is 
so even as those very same issues have consumed much 
of the American debate over new contract law. 56 While 
the importance of the Gennan teachings of Rechtsgeschiiji and Willenserk-
Idrung. See George P. Fletcher, Three Nearly Sacred Books in Western Law, 
54 ARK. L. REv. 1 (2001). 
55 Stefan Riesenfeld, The Impact of German Legal Ideas and Institutions on 
Legal Thought and Institutions in the United States, in Mathias Reimann (ed.), 
THE RECEPTION OF CONTINENTAL IDEAS IN THE COMMON LAW WORLD 1820-
1920,89,91 (1993). 
56 See James R. Maxeiner, Standard Terms Contracting in the Global Elec-
tronic Age: European Alternatives: 29 YALE J. INT'L L. 109 (2003). 
[108] IUS GENTIUM· Spring 2006 
When Are Agreements Enforceable? 
creating a single European Market has made it a matter 
of course in Europe to examine foreign solutions-a 
part of the Zeitgeist57-it remains extraordinary in the 
United States. 
Why are American jurists so insular? It was not al-
ways so. In the nineteenth century Americans were fre-
quently keenly aware of foreign alternatives and anx-
ious to learn from them. One of our most famous Su-
preme Court Justices, Joseph Story, said: "There is no 
country on earth which has more to gain than ours by 
the thorough study of foreign jurisprudence.,,58 There is 
a lively debate right now between present-day Justices 
Breyer and Scalia, as to whether the United States Su-
preme Court should take note of foreign punishments in 
applying the cruel and unusual prohibition of the U.S. 
Constitution. 
While the American University debate is encourag-
ing, the sad fact remains that the vast majority of 
American jurists lack any first-hand experience with 
Civil Law systems. Far more Americans enrolled in 
European universities to study the European Civil Law 
in the second half of the nineteenth century than did in 
the second half of the twentieth century. In Civil Law 
faculties in Europe and Asia, serious foreign study is 
the rule among faculty members rather than the rare 
S7 See Abo Junker, Rechtsvergleichung als Grundlagenfach, 1994 
JURISTENZEITUNG 921. 
S8 Progress of Jurisprudence, Address Delivered Before the Suffolk Bar at their 
Anniversary September 4, 1821, at Boston, reprinted in THE MISCELLANEOUS 
WRITINGS OF JOSEPH STORY 198, 235 (1852). He added: Let us not vainly 
imagine that we have unlocked and exhausted all the stores of juridical wisdom 
and policy." Id. 
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exception that in the United States. 59 Serious study of a 
foreign system, in the language of that system, is essen-
tial to serious comparative law work. 
American lack of interest in foreign solutions is not 
malicious. There are many reasons for the lack of inter-
est. Among the principal reasons for American insular-
ity are American political hegemony-and the lack of 
language skills that that brings-and American legal 
methods that anticipate incremental judicial develop-
ment of law rather than legislation.6o 
In the nineteenth century, the United States did not 
enjoy world hegemony. In that century, Americans did 
study foreign legal solutions. But two world wars and 
the development of American hegemony in the world 
have led to American neglect of foreign legal solutions. 
I have to say that European history does not make it 
easy for those Americans who would like to promote 
Civil Law solutions. Inevitably, our American listeners 
object: the Civil Law had Hitler and we did not. Thus, 
in the twentieth century Americans switched from 
learning from foreign law to teaching American law to 
foreigners. American law became "imperial law." If the 
first five years of the twenty-first century are any guide, 
59 One law EU fmn-Freshfields-probably has more jurists who have seri-
ously studied both Civil and Common Law than all American law faculties 
combined! While American summer law school programs abroad encourage 
students to learn foreign and comparative law, few observers would count them 
as serious attempts to learn foreign legal systems. 
60 See generally Ernst Stiefel & James R. Maxeiner, Why are u.s. Lawyers not 
Learningfrom Comparative Law?, in THE INTERNATIONAL PRACTICE OF LAW 
213 (Nedim Vogtetal. eds., 1997). 
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Americans in this century are, if anything, going to be 
more "imperial" in law than in the last.61 
One consequence of American hegemony and of the 
resulting dominance of English as the world language is 
a lack of skills with foreign languages on the part of 
America's intellectual leadership. Before the First 
World War, 25 percent of American high school stu-
dents studied German; since then, the number studying 
German has never exceeded 4 percent. Even under the 
best of circumstances, Americans would not normally 
learn foreign languages at a level sufficient to use them 
in academic work. The land is huge and there is little 
need or use for foreign languages for most people. I 
grew up in St. Louis: the nearest places where foreign 
languages are spoken are Mexico or Quebec, each of 
which is about 1500 kilometers away. Contrast that to 
Europe; in Belgium alone, there are three official lan-
guages: Flemish, French and German. Moreover, Eng-
lish is inescapable here. The 50 American states have 
one official language: English. The 25 EU Member 
States have around two dozen. Finally, in Continental 
Europe, the first foreign language is automatic: English. 
In the United States, with which foreign language 
should a student begin: Spanish, Chinese, French, Ger-
man, Russian, Italian, Japanese? 
Yet without foreign language skills, one cannot learn 
the Civil Law systems first hand. One must rely on 
61 Cf, Ugo Mattei, A Theory of Imperial Law: A Study on u.s. Hegemony and 
the Latin ReSistance, 10 IND. J. GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 383, 391 (2003). 
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translations. There is a natural tendency to ignore that 
which one cannot understand and to regard it as unim-
portant. Thus, even as American law school faculties 
have shown a greatly increased interest in scholarship, 
comparative law has not benefited. 
VI. A EUROPEAN CIVIL CODE? 
I cannot resist the temptation to consider briefly one 
of the most interesting projects in the works today, a 
European Civil Code. As an American comparativist 
eager to get his colleagues to pay attention to the Civil 
Law, there is nothing that I should welcome more than 
a European Civil Code. No doubt that Code, much pre-
paratory work and commentary would be in English. 
The Civil Law would finally be accessible in English. 
My colleagues could seize upon this wealth of legal 
learning. That learning would have behind it the force 
of the European Union-a political entity larger than 
our own-and would no longer be the patchwork law of 
25 or 27 or 28 European states. 
Whether a single European Code would work for 
Europe, or is even politically tenable, I do not know. 
Maybe the legal certainty and unity desired would be 
better obtained by a mixture of conflicts of law rules 
and of harmonized, not unified laws. 
I do feel relatively sure, however, that devices such as 
the Principles of European Contract Law alone would 
not be sufficient to bring about the desired legal unity. 
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American experiences suggest that unless Europeans 
are willing to accept a level of legal uncertainty much 
greater than they historically have, voluntary ap-
proaches such as legal theory, Restatements and volun-
tary state laws, are not the answer. Legal unity and cer-
tainty should be imposed at the European-level even if 
that unity allows a great deal of diversity and subsidiar-
ity within it. 
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